Friday January 19, 2007
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Airport security still ineffective

By Arcadiy Kantor

I consider myself to be a rather fortunate person. One of the aspects of my life that I particularly appreciate is that my friends are a diverse group coming from many different cultures.

As such, I tend to hear comments and critiques about a wide spectrum of American society. Perhaps the most frequent complaint I get from my friends (aside from the fairly universal "Tech is shafting us") is related to airport security.

The experience of passing through an American airport has become a big joke among my friends who look even remotely like they are from the Middle East.

I'm sure we've all heard quips like "I'd better shave before my flight tomorrow" coming from these people, who know they are virtually guaranteed to be subjected to the "extra-special" search whenever they pass through security no matter what they do or where they are actually from.

The fairly blatant racial profiling that goes on is, of course, a terrible thing in its own right. But their complaints started me thinking about the state of airport security as a whole since September 2001.

The amount spent on all the new security measures is staggering, and the inconvenience of going through all of it is monumental. And yet, as far as I can tell, we aren't really any safer now than we were six years ago.

Last summer, the American and British governments successfully foiled a plot that involved liquid explosives disguised as beverages or cosmetic products. The result of the plot was a brief but near-total prohibition on liquid items in passengers' carry-on luggage.

Even now, the restrictions have been loosened only to the extent of allowing a one-quart clear plastic bag that must be scanned separately from your other luggage.

Personally, I cannot fathom what the officials who come up with these things expect such a policy to prevent.

They state that the regulation is in place because they have no way to detect liquid explosives in carry-on luggage.But the types and varieties of explosives are diverse enough that simply forbidding large containers of liquid has no chance of stopping a determined terrorist who is set on blowing up a plane.

Most of the other security measures strike me as similarly questionable, and most importantly as extremely near-sighted.

Sure, no one will be able to sneak a bomb aboard an airplane in their cowboy boots thanks to each person being forced to x-ray their shoes.

But while everyone is busy tying and untying their shoelaces and the security lines stretch miles back, what is preventing a person from walking in the middle of the crowd and setting off a bomb there?

Perhaps such an attack wouldn't have as devastating a mental effect as taking down an airplane, but the loss of life would still be tragic. And it would be caused by the very tools that are supposed to protect us.

For that matter, why is everyone so convinced that an airplane will be the next vector of attack for any potential terrorist group?

It's been done once, and I can't see any particularly compelling reason to target airplanes again in the next major terrorist attack on American soil.

Indeed, there have been plots foiled, as well as false threats (like one in which an innocent but rather dumb person posted a hypothetical threat of a chemical attack on several large NFL stadiums as part of a "scariest potential threat" contest that he failed to tell anyone about) that had nothing to do with airplanes at all.

Yet security is by far the most severe for flight.

I am certainly not the first person to have these ideas about just how secure we really are; I have no doubt that there are countless people working in the government agencies responsible for making these decisions who are far smarter than me and are well aware of all the concerns I have expressed.

But if they know it's ineffective and I know it's ineffective, why are they bothering with these security restrictions in the first place?

I think the goal of the efforts is to appeal to our gut, not to our sense of reason.

By making us jump through hoops every time we pass through the airport, we consciously or subconsciously feel reassured that yes, there is someone out there protecting us, and by God, no blasé terrorist will be able to walk aboard our plane and blow it up.

We are paranoid, and we are willing to sacrifice a great deal for the big-brotherly pat on the back.

Both the government and the industry are well aware of this, and they have decided fewer passengers will stop traveling as a result of the inconveniences they must undergo than as a result of appearing to do nothing to fight terrorism.

And as a result we are all taking off our shoes, taking out our laptops and buying little tubes of toothpaste that will fit into a small plastic bag.

I wish I could wrap up with a nice bow of "here's how we can work to make the situation better." But I can't think of any real way to do that.

So consider this as a simple plea for reason: If people keep focused on the actual benefits (or lack thereof) of this protection perhaps we can escape the gruesome fate of cavity searches 10 or 20 years from now.